This article aims to suggest one possible -pragmatist in a very broad sense of the term -approach to making sense of the way truth and objectivity function within the discipline of history. It argues that history doesn't need a new theory of truth; rather, it is necessary to analyse in theoretical terms how truth is understood and used in historical inquiry. This article considers truth as an epistemic term in a certain givenhistoriographical -use, and objectivity is understood as an epistemic virtue valued in a specific contemporary scientific community, that of professional historians.
way truth and objectivity function within the discipline of history. I don't think history needs a new theory of truth; rather, it is necessary to analyse in theoretical terms how truth is understood and used in historical inquiry. Thus, the relevant question is not whether history satisfies one or another theory of truth or objectivity, but which are the conceptions of truth and objectivity practised within the discipline of history.1 I am not interested in truth in any general metaphysical sense, but as an epistemic term in a certain givenhistoriographical -use; and I understand objectivity as an epistemic virtue valued in a specific contemporary scientific community, that of professional historians. 2 Everyone about to enter into a discussion of truth will necessarily recall Richard Rorty's persistently repeated call for rejecting the concepts of truth and objectivity altogether and replacing them with such terms as, for instance, justification, conversation and solidarity: "the point of edifying philosophy is to keep the conversation going rather than to find objective truth," as Rorty put it as early as 1978.3 In the context of philosophy of history, similar calls 1 Here, I will immediately take the opportunity of referring to an important forerunner who was among the first to emphasise the epistemic autonomy of the discipline of history as requiring a specific internal analysis ("history is an epistemically licit discipline which deserves to be taken seriously on its own terms") -I mean Leon J. Goldstein, who has for undeservedly long been left on the margins of the contemporary discussions, even though his views have attracted ever more attention in recent years. See L. J. Goldstein, Historical Knowing . 2 Generally, the use and function of truth in history writing can be examined along two distinct lines: 1) by analysing, based on an empirical corpus, how historians themselves interpret historical truth in their texts and what role the concept of truth plays in their discourse, seeing that the methods of discourse analysis are probably best suited for this kind of approach; 2) by analysing, in theoretical terms, not what historians think of the truth but how they (often unwittingly) use it in their texts -what function the truth fulfills there; possibly, the tools best fit for this approch may be those borrowed from the philosophy of science, and from epistemology. The present article should be classified under the latter category. 3 R. Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 1978, p. 377. The same call occurs in various phrasing through many of Rorty's works; see, e.g., have been sounded repeatedly over the last decades, among others by Alun Munslow, for example: "I remain surprised not that there is a continuing debate over the definition of truth in history but that it is a matter of debate at all."4 Unfortunately the calls for rejecting the concept of truth seem to have been anything but fruitful; instead, they appear to have added fuel to the fire of debates. Thus, instead of altogether discarding the traditional concepts of truth and objectivity, it seems more consequential to try and re-inform them. Truth should not be seen as an exasperating phantasm to be delivered of, but an intriguing concept bon à penser. Or, as Michael Dummett recently put it: "The task of the philosopher is neither to belittle truth nor to exalt it, neither to deny it nor to defend it, but to explain why we need the concept and what it is to possess it."5 The calls for rejecting truth have fallen on particularly barren ground amongst historians who still, quite unanimously and shamelessly, regard the pursuit of truth as a cornerstone of their professional work and don't feel the slightest inclination towards giving up debates over truth -as proven, among many others, by Carlo Ginzburg: "The debate about truth is one of the most important (in a sense, the most important) intellectual issues with which we are confronted."6 This observation was only recently seconded in this journal by Frank Ankersmit; and I shall happily take his insight for one of the guidelines of the present article: "In fact, the question whether there is something special about truth in history is one of the most important problems in philosophy of history."7 Yet I dare say that the notions of truth and objectivity can be saved in the discipline of history only if we are prepared to revise some of our traditional conceptions of what the desirable properties of truth and objectivity involve.
Toward a Pragmatist Philosophy of History
Placing my approach under the general rubric of "pragmatism" as I do, I nevertheless have to specify that I conceive of "pragmatism" in a very broad sense -more precisely, in two different senses at once. On the one hand, I understand "pragmatism" in linguistical terms, that is, in my discussion I partially rely on the standpoints of pragmatic linguistics, analysing history writing in the light of the theory of speech acts. But on the other hand, I classify my reflections under pragmatist philosophy in a very general sense of the term, philosophically founding some of my reflections on the views of Peirce, James and Dewey, as well as their later followers. Thus the present article can, in a certain sense, be regarded as a small contribution towards working out a pragmatist philosophy -or theory -of history, something that I regard as an important general aim for the future.8
by Quentin Skinner; see, for instance, his Visions of Politics, vol Pragmatism, of course, is not a clearly delimited philosophical doctrine but a rather heterogeneous school of thought that has from the very beginning been branching off in various directions. Yet on the basis of a Wittgensteinian 'family resemblance' , it is possible to infer a number of themes or principles that are characteristic of pragmatism in general (but not exclusively), and therefore also form the philosophical framework of the present discussion.9 In the first place, pragmatism is characterised by what David Hildebrand has called "the practical starting point":10 pragmatism analyses philosophical problems and concepts in practical and experiential terms, while evading a clear separation of theory and practice. Knowledge and thinking are always seen as forms of activity -as experimental inquiry. Secondly, most pragmatists hold in common the principle of fallibilism: each belief must be supported by existing evidence, it is adopted only temporarily and can be developed, altered or altogether discarded as further evidence mounts.11 Finally (although the list could certainly be continued), I would emphasise the conviction that in scientific or other inquiry, it is the community of researchers or interpreters that plays a key role in controlling and validating knowledge of a certain type. "Every new idea and theory has to be submitted to this community for confirmation into and test", as John Dewey explicitly expressed it in his day.12 In pragmatism, the project of inquiry is always a social, not individual one. The pragmatist slant of the present article ties in very well with some recent developments in philosophy of science, where a "practical" or "performative" turn13 or post-positivism and naturalism are attracting ever more attention. These developments spring from the ground of "scientific pluralism"14 and value the primacy of scientific practices before philosophical analysis. Philosophy is forgoing its "epistemic sovereignty",15 and it is being understood with increasing frequency as "continuous with (or perhaps a part of) empirical science".16 Or, in John H. Zammito's happy phrasing as he summarised these developments: "Thus the distinctive move in recent science studies has been the shift from conceiving of science as knowledge to conceiving of science as practice."17 I do not intend to reopen here the old debate over whether history is a science or not, but will follow Collingwood in his observation that " 'science' means any organized body of knowledge"18 and that in the discipline of history, knowledge about the past is produced in a certain specific way and within a specific institutional framework, such as enables history to be seen as a science at least in the "weak" sense of the word. Thus, whenever I speak about historical inquiry or history writing in the following pages, I always understand them only in the narrow disciplinary sense -as scientific (i.e. academic) historiography practised by professional historians. 19 I will develop my argument in three interrelated steps. First, I shall make the case for a pragmatic "truth pact" in history writing, arguing that the conditions of historical truth depend on the illocutionary force of historical utterance. Second, I shall propose that this "truth pact" is "guaranteed" by fellow historians or, in other words: truth claims in history writing are based not on their direct relation with reality but on a disciplinary consensus as to the methods of inquiry, cognitive values and epistemic virtues. Third, I shall make a clear connection between truth and proof in history writing, arguing that the "truth pact" is grounded in a critical analysis of the available evidence.
"Truth Pact" in History Writing
It seems to me, following many others, that on a general level, the most fruitful way of understanding the function of truth in history and other scientific disciplines is through an analogy with the Wittgensteinian "language game". 20 The meaning and function of scientific interpretations can best be assessed in their various uses, in the context of specific language games and life forms. In the recent happy wording of John Caputo: "Truth is like a winning move in a game, like checkmate in chess, but there are different rules for different genres. As there is a plurality of games, so there is a family of truths, in the lower case and the plural, with standards proper to each sphere. There is no metalanguage, no one trans-historical overarching game or rule or story, no high court of Reason, but rather a multiplicity of good reasons in multiple forms of life."21 Caputo immediately goes on to qualify that the language game model must not be taken to the extreme; on the one hand, one must avoid isolating the games too much, rather emphasising the "family resemblance" between tamm journal of the philosophy of history 8 (2014) 265-290 different games; on the other hand, rules must not be made unnecessarily rigid, valuing instead their flexibility and changeability.
It was largely Wittgenstein's recommendation -to study the meaning in the usage of words -that provided, in the 1950s, the grounds on which J. L. Austin built his pragmatic theory of language or, more precisely, the theory of speech acts, developed later, in the 1960s and 1970s, by John Searle.22 In my opinion, it is precisely the theory of speech acts that enables us to understand with greatest adequacy the function of truth in history writing. While previously, history philosophical discussions have been dominated by semantic concepts of truth, the pragmatic dimension of truth appears more relevant in practical historical inquiry. In other words, we shouldn't be studying only what historians say (write) and how it relates to reality, but rather what they are doing while they say it -that is, the intention and illocutionary force of what they say. Here is not the place to go into the detail of the theory of speech acts and its various elaborations, so I will just give a short formulation of my thesis and then try and argue for it -I will claim that the most fruitful way of analysing history writing is by defining it as an assertive illocutionary act. Let's recall that in Austin's footsteps Searle distinguished five basic types of illocutionary acts: assertives, directives, commissives, expressives and declaratives. 23 The typology relies on identifying what is called the illocutionary point of a speech act, since each speech act has an inner point or goal the attaining of which is a prerequisite for the act's success. In order to explain an assertive illocutionary act, Searle writes: "The point or purpose of the members of the assertive class is to commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something's being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition."24 In other words: speakers succeed in attaining an assertive illocutionary point, when the proposition they express represents circumstances that are true within the context of the utterance.
Before continuing up this line of thought, I will allow myself a digression and introduce an analogy or conceptual figure helpful, in my view, for under-standing the function of truth in history writing. At the beginning of the 1970s, as the French literary scholar Philippe Lejeune began his research on the autobiographical genre, he faced a dilemma as to how an autobiography should be defined. Fairly soon he gave up the conventional semantic or syntactic criteria and turned to pragmatist theories. He decided to base his definition not on the texts but rather on their reception, or more precisely, on the interaction that takes place between an autobiographical text and its reader. From this vantage point, it was the author's implicit or explicit "pact" with the reader, his voluntary commitment to speak the truth -called by Lejeune the "autobiographical pact" -that proved to be the definitive characteristic of an autobiography.25 Thus, according to Lejeune, autobiography must be defined primarily on the pragmatic level, "it is a mode of reading as much as it is a type of writing; it is a historically variable contractual effect".26 Even though Lejeune emphasises the inevitability of the "truth pact" for a text to be classified as an autobiography, this is not to say that the reader should regard everything put down by the autobiographer as strictly corresponding to reality: "What's important about the autobiography is that the referential pact be concluded and subsequently also observed; but it is not necessary for the result to bear a strict similarity to reality. The reader may find the referential pact ill observed without the text losing any of its referential value (quite the contrary);" but -Lejeune finds it necessary to add -"the same will not be the case with historical or journalistic texts."27 I believe that Lejeune's approach might turn out to be very useful in defining the nature of historiography and its relations with the category of truth.28 In the footsteps of Lejeune, I would argue that we should search for truth in historiography in the mutual agreement, in the "contractual effect" between the historian and his readers.29 Every historian has to make a kind of "truth pact" with his addressees, asserting, more often implicitly than explicitly, that it is his intention to tell the truth. Needless to say, this commitment rarely takes such an abrupt and total form, it is rather an implicit pact of honesty or a declaration of his intention to confine himself to the truth bound to the evidence and disciplinary practices, as well as an explicit indication of the field to which this oath applies. However, it is extremely important that this "pact" be sincere and serious, not part of the game we can often witness in the case of fiction.
Returning now to Searle's discussion of the assertive illocutionary act, we see that the pragmatic rules set out by him as prerequisites for an assertion as a type of illocutionary act are at the same time also rather well suited to function as ground rules for the historiographical "truth pact":
The essential rule: the maker of an assertion commits himself to the truth of the expressed proposition.30 2. The preparatory rules: the speaker must be in a position to provide evidence or reasons for the truth of the expressed proposition. 3. The expressed proposition must not be obviously true to both the speaker and the hearer in the context of utterance. 4. The sincerity rule: the speaker commits himself to a belief in the truth of the expressed proposition.31
Needless to say, the above rules as such do not constitute sufficient conditions for historical truth; rather, they form the necessary grounds for an historical assertion to be considered as true. Whenever an historian makes a statement, asserts, narrates, explains, or discusses anything, he is looking for an agreement with the readers based on the recognition of a truth claim.32 Thus, trying to draw some preliminary conclusions from our discussion so far, we could say that in historiography, truth is an intentional category based on a pragmatic "truth pact" between the historian and his readers. Yet the question immediately arises, how the reader will recognise the author's intention of truth? Here we must first recall, together with Searle, that as far as intentionality is concerned, we need to distinguish between its structural and communicative functions, as it were; in other words, only a derived, communicative intentionality is characteristic of public representations (such as history writing), meaning that intentionality does not move across minds automatically but must be communicated with conventional means, that is, by using verbal or other signals.33 Each text, be it fictional or factual, must send out certain signals in order to be adequately received. While Searle thought such signals could be found only on the pragmatic level,34 more recent work in narratology has proved that they can also be identified on the textual and paratextual levels. features peculiar to itself -"marks of historicity" (marques d'historicité), as Krzysztof Pomian has called them.36 These are textual elements allowing, on the one hand, the reader to choose the right regime of reception, while on the other they provide the extremely necessary opportunity of checking the written text later on. A prominent position amongst these "marks of historicity" is held by footnotes, whether they refer to the historian's own evidence or to the work of other scholars. Although the primary function of the footnote is to communicate information, it also signals the author's truth intent; it assures the reader that whatever I say, it is not my own invention, you may look it up, if you please, and you'll arrive at the same conclusions.37 Anthony Grafton, author of an interesting inquiry into the history of the footnote, justly concludes that "the culturally contingent and eminently fallible footnote offers the only guarantee we have that statements about the past derive from identifiable sources. And that is the only ground we have to trust them."38 But in addition to footnotes, a historiographical text includes other "signals of factuality",39 such as citations of evidence, bibliography, charts, tables, illustrations, etc. Nor must the paratextual signals included in historical texts be underestimated, since the intention of a historiographical text is often signalled to the reader by the author's name, the title, cover design, book series or journal where it was published, the introductory text on the cover, and so on. At the same time, however, it must be kept in mind that recognition of a text as historiography is ultimately still something that happens a priori, it must precede the identification of the specific "marks" and "signals" of a historical text. It is precisely because we presume (by previous learning or experience) that historiographical text must have certain characteristic features that we automatically tune in on a suitable reading regime and are able to see the lack of some feature (as, for example, the author's deliberate omission of footnotes) as a "minus-existence" unable, however, to undermine the system as such. 40 This line of argument logically leads up to another important subject, that of the difference between factual (historiographical) and fictional text; although it is not possible nor strictly necessary to dwell on this much-argued issue in the present article. I will but observe that in order to understand history writing adequately, it is important to note the distinction between a factual and a fictional narrative. Although narrative is one of the most important cognitive instruments in the service of history writing, as has been brilliantly demonstrated by the works of Louis Mink, Arthur Danto, Hayden White, Paul Ricoeur, and many others, it is not to say that history writing is absorbed by fictionality. As Chiel van der Akker recently showed, the distinction in the context of historiography between narratives claiming to be true and others that make no such claims was in fact drawn already by Mink. Akker phrases this distinction very succinctly in the context of the truth problem: "The point is not that we should focus on the content of the historical narrative if we are to discuss its truth. The point is that the difference between narratives which purport to be true (and can be doubted and turn out to be false) and narratives which are not supposed to be true (and therefore are not supposed to be doubted nor turn out to be false), cannot be a difference in content only, for it is at least also a difference in purpose." 41 In the same spirit, contemporary pragmatist theory of fiction finds that whereas factual narratives advance claims of referential truthfulness, fictional narratives advance no such claims. 42 The distinction emerges perhaps most clearly in the comparison not of factual and fictional, but factual and forged narratives. A forgery presents itself to the reader on exactly the same grounds as every other factual narrative, concluding a seemingly similar "truth pact" with its readers, but as soon as the forgery is revealed, its radical difference from a genuine factual narrative becomes apparent. And the revelation does not result in a fictional, but a forged narrative -not fictional history, but false history. In this context, it is very edifying to analyse those cases where one or another author has been caught forging history -whether it consist in breaking the "truth pact" in historiography (like, for instance, David Irving) or in autobiography (like Binjamin Wilkomirski alias Bruno Dösseker).43
Disciplinary Objectivity in History Writing
If we agree that truth, in history writing, is an intentional category based on a "truth pact" with the readers and signalled in many various ways both performatively and textually, the question next arises what is it that makes the receiver believe that truth claim. Unlike an autobiography representing what no other source but itself can represent to us, historiography is not exempt from the test of verification; the historian's "truth pact" needs "guarantors" in order to be convincing.44 While traditionally the truth of the historian's statements has been often linked to their correspondence to historical reality,45 the pragmatist viewpoint considers it impossible to check any such correspondence since it is only the historian's claim, not a provable fact. In pragmatist terms, the historian's truth intent is based not on its direct relation with reality but is mediated in various ways and based on a disciplinary consensus as to methods of inquiry, cognitive values and epistemic virtues. The "truth pact" is made reliable and checkable primarily by what might be called the regulative ideal of objectivity. Definitions of objectivity are, of course, at least as numerous as the various theories of truth, and the critical analysis of them is a task that surpasses the possibilities of the present article. Therefore I shall confine myself to outlining just two general principles. First, "objectivity" is by no means a self-evident or given thing, but a historically evolved concept the meaning of which has undergone several important transformations in both philosophy and science.46 Secondly, however, "objectivity" is nothing monolithic or unequivocal; on the contrary, the semantic field and practical uses of the term are very broad and complex.47 In view of the above, it must thus be asked whether it is at all possible to speak about objectivity in contemporary historical inquiry -and if it is, then about which objectivity? I think that the right way to approach this question was shown by Paul Ricoeur as long as sixty years ago:
We expect from history a certain objectivity, an objectivity that fits it, and it is from this and no other term that we must begin. So what do we expect to see under that title? Objectivity must here be understood in its strict epistemological sense: objective is what has been elaborated, ordered and comprehended by methodical thought, and can thus be made understandable by such thought. . . . This is not to say that it should in any way be similar to objectivity in physics or biology; the levels of objectivity are as many as are methodical behaviours. We thus expect history to add its own little province to the diverse empire of objectivity.48
Thus neither historiography -nor any other scientific discipline, in fact -has any use for the idea of "absolute objectivity" that aims at the elimination of all "subjective distortion"; instead, we should follow Ricoeur in providing the concept of "objectivity" with a far more concrete content and link it to the established methods of inquiry and cognitive values recognised by a given scientific discipline, in our case -that of history. In other words, we should proceed from the notion of objectivity defined by Allan Megill as disciplinary objectivity:
Disciplinary objectivity emphasizes not universal criteria of judgement but particular, yet still authoritative, disciplinary criteria. It emphasizes not the eventual convergence of all inquirers of good will but the proximate convergence of accredited inquirers within a given field. Defined institutionally, disciplinary objectivity refers to the claim by practitioners of a particular discipline (subdiscipline, research field, etc) to have authoritative jurisdiction over its area of competence. Such claims take different forms, with different degrees of explicitness and articulation. The groundings vary from discipline to discipline, from field to field, and they change over time as well.49
The idea of disciplinary objectivity is pragmatic by nature, and corresponds pretty well to both Peirce's and Dewey's conceptions of objectivity. In more recent times, "pragmatic objectivity" has indeed been spoken of in the context of both media studies and philosophy of history.50 Pragmatists emphasise that objectivity is a way of doing things, "to speak or think "objectively" is to inquire in an epistemically responsible way which enacts certain rules and virtues".51 From Peirce onwards, pragmatism has understood "project of inquiry" as a social, not individual phenomenon.52 Objectivity is not a feature characteristic of the statements, but describes the activity of inquirers whose interpretations acquire the quality of objectivity through certain epistemic attitudes. 53 Pragmatically understood disciplinary objectivity relies on the idea of disciplinary consensus -it adopts the elementary consensus current in a particular discipline as its standard of objectivity. Thus, in order to use the concept of disciplinary objectivity meaningfully, we must first answer the question, what is discipline and what is consensus. My understanding of discipline is practical and largely derives from Michel Foucault's idea that "a discipline is defined by a domain of objects, a set of methods, a corpus of propositions considered to be true, a play of rules and definitions, of techniques and instruments".54 In other words, a discipline tamm journal of the philosophy of history 8 (2014) 265-290 constitutes a kind of "framework within which certain approaches are legitimated, certain kinds of language and argumentation accepted, certain forms of dissemination of knowledge favored, and certain kinds of standards of peer evaluation accepted as conventional -and within which others are not".55 Briefly, discipline is a socially constituted set of practices, a specifically disciplined way of producing knowledge. But it is also very important to keep in mind that a discipline is always historically and spatially situated, and submitted to changes and challenges. Appropriation of disciplinary principles is never a matter of merely passive acceptance: neophytes often interpret, adapt, or even modify the standards of a discipline.56 The discipline of history in its present form has evolved mainly over the last couple of centuries as a result of three mutually interlinked processes: professionalisation, organisation, and institutionalisation.57 The discipline of history certainly does not form a single homogeneous entity in the modern world; yet most professional historians working in such societies as respect the freedom of expression, share similar attitudes, habits, and values -a fact that enables us justly to operate with the concept of a "discipline of history".
This last fact leads us to the question of how to understand and define disciplinary consensus. Because it is, in fact, quite astonishing that the socially and intellectually very heterogeneous community of professional historians should share broadly the same basic attitudes, or as Aviezer Tucker has put it: "It is surprising to note that historians of diverse interests, historical periods and contexts, creeds, nationalities, political opinions, and other collective The evolution of the discipline of history is an interesting and important subject in its own rights that has been ever more carefully investigated, particularly in recent years; a few of the more noteworthy works would be, for instance: D. R. Kelley identities have independently reached similar beliefs about history and have adopted many of the beliefs about history that resulted from the research of others."58 Tucker articulates three prerequisites that must be satisfied by the scientific community in order that a disciplinary consensus based on knowledge could be born: the community should be 1) uncoerced,59 2) uniquely heterogeneous and 3) sufficiently large (including hundreds of people who are geographically, institutionally, and professionally dispersed).60 On philosophical grounds, consensus as a goal or a means of finding truth has justly attracted sharp criticism.61 Therefore we should avoid conceiving of consensus in the discipline of history as an aim in itself but rather see it as a common basic assumption as to how methods of inquiry, epistemic values and evidence should be used. The cornerstone that the historians' disciplinary consensus rests on is their agreement not as to the answers given, but the questions raised and the ways in which it is possible to answer them. Thus, the consensus should be looked for not only in unanimity (that certainly exists on many past issues), but also in disagreement. "That historians disagree may be characteristic, and just as relevant would be where they agree to disagree, and where they agree about what they are disagreeing about", as Jonathan Gorman has happily phrased it.62 It is not without interest to note that one of the most systematic critics of the idea of consensus, Nicholas Rescher, also finds science the only field where that concept has a certain function. Very similarly to the concept of "disciplinary consensus", Rescher speaks about a "consensus of the competent" which is able to "provide an instrumentality of plausible estimation, albeit only in situations where cogent -and thus more than merely consensual -standards are in hand."63 58
Tucker, Our Knowledge of the Past, p. 24.
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It is of course arguable whether it is correct to speak about uncoercion in the context of a discipline, since the etymology of the very term discipline itself points to a foundation in control and power, whether it be symbolic or institutional. Notwithstanding, I shall in the present article follow Tucker's treatment, according to which coercion should be understood as mainly extra-disciplinary pressure. This also means that strictly speaking, it is possible to speak about scientific disciplines and disciplinary objectivity only in the framework of a democratic society, cf. Appleby, Hunt, and Jacob, Disciplinary objectivity thus rests on the critical standards and cognitive values that have evolved within a discipline in order to produce knowledge. Hardly would it be possible to formalise these standards and values or to present an exhaustive list of them; however, this does not mean that there is, at present, very much disagreement as to their common core.64 By way of summing up, I would only recall here Marc Bevir's three rules of objective behaviour or intellectual honesty, which very appropriately outline the minimal programme of disciplinary objectivity:
The first rule: objective behaviour requires a willingness to take criticism seriously. The second rule: objective behaviour implies a preference for established standards of evidence and reason, backed up by a preference for challenges to these standards which themselves rest on impersonal, consistent criteria of evidence and reason. The third rule: objective behaviour implies a preference for positive speculative theories which suggest exciting new predictions rather than negative ones which merely block criticisms of existing theories.65
Evidence and Fallibilism in History Writing
As we repeatedly saw above, truth intent could not function in history if it were limited to just illocutionary force and disciplinary guarantee; the main prerequisite for the truth claim is its foundation on evidence. Somewhat unexpectedly, history philosophical discussions sometimes tend to forget this fact. And that is the case even when it is unanimously agreed that the historian studies not past events, but their traces,66 or what is, in a generalised manner, called "historical evidence" or known by the more traditional (even though slightly misleading) term "sources".67 Thus the central problem of the philosophy of history is not the relation between history writing and reality, but between history writing and evidence.
Perhaps the first to realise the need of conceptualising the central significance of evidence in history writing was Collingwood. It is certainly not an accident that he decided to dedicate the first chapter of his last, unfinished history philosophical work, The Principles of History (1939), to evidence.68 But the fundamental significance of evidence is clearly highlighted already in his article "The Limits of Historical Knowledge", of 1928. It is extremely interesting that Collingwood understands history writing in a rather Wittgensteinian vein as a kind of "game" in which clear "rules" must be followed. The first and most important rule he articulates as follows: "You must not say anything, however true, for which you cannot produce evidence. who can show that his view of what happened is the one which the evidence accessible to all players, when criticised up to the hilt, supports."69 Thus, historical knowledge is nothing but a critical analysis of all existing evidence and the conclusions drawn from it concerning historical reality. These conclusions are never final (although sometimes beyond reasonable doubt), but merely probable and subject to later revisions. 70 And whenever a segment of the past has gone by without leaving any trace at all, it cannot become the object of historical knowledge, even though the events that took place during it are not made non-existent by this fact. 71 But still -what is historical evidence? First we must observe that potentially, anything perceivable through our senses can function as evidence in the work of the historian. But evidence is never a thing unto itself, but always evidence in support of (or against) something. In other words: it becomes historical evidence only when it is conceived of as such in the framework of a specific historical problem. Or, as Collingwood once put it: "Evidence is evidence only when some one contemplates it historically."72 Thus, the constitution of evidence is inseparable from its interpretation -evidence is not anything given to the historian but is born only in the process of interpretation. Each piece of historical evidence always contains some interpretation, and each historical interpretation must include a sufficient amount of evidence. This also means that simple evidentialism, according to which an "epistemic fact is determined entirely by the person's evidence", is not valid in history writing. 73 The collect-ing and examining of evidence inevitably happens within the framework of specific hypotheses and theoretical positions, which is indeed the reason why historians using the same or similar evidence might arrive at more or less different conclusions. 74 As also the reason why no piece of evidence can ever be exhausted in historical inquiry, since it is always possible to re-interpret them in the light of new hypotheses and theories.
Practical history writing abounds with examples of how subtle the symbiosis between evidence and hypotheses, traces of the past and the inquirer's theories, really is in the historian's work. Alongside with many others, a good illustration of this is provided by Natalie Zemon Davis's book The Return of Martin Guerre, which presents, on the basis of comparatively patchy evidence, a very convincing and methodologically original interpretation of identity games in sixteenth-century French village community. Right in the introduction to the book, Davis acknowledges: "What I offer you here is in part my invention, but held tightly in check by the voices of the past."75 Commenting years later: "I had wanted my book to be an exploration of truth and doubt, to suggest analogies between a community's search for truth about identity in the sixteenth century and the historian's search for truth about the past today. We historians do our best to get evidence and give it convincing interpretation, but thorny issues usually remain and press for further inquiry."76 Although the historian is guided in his work by evidence, his attitude towards them is, as a rule, critical; in a sense it is the historian's duty to ask questions of the evidence that it was never intended to answer or even what it don't speak about, at all (the so-called argumentum ex silentio). Ginzburg has compared evidence to a "distorted glass", adding: "Without a thorough analysis of its inherent distortions (the codes according to which it has been constructed and/or it must be perceived), a sound historical reconstruction is impossible. But this statement should be read also the other way around: a purely internal reading of tamm journal of the philosophy of history 8 (2014) 265-290 the evidence, without any reference to its referential dimension, is impossible as well." 77 The analysis of evidence, however, is not individual work in the process of historical inquiry, but is generally carried out within the disciplinary framework and in mutual relations of influence with one's colleagues. Each conclusion drawn or interpretation made on the basis of some piece of evidence is subjected to disciplinary discussion (whether it be the formal process of peer review or the less formal debate between colleagues), and it stands as the (a) best possible version as long as a better and more convincing one is advanced. In other words, the interpretation of historical evidence is ruled over by the principle of fallibilism, according to which certain interpretations are provisionally accepted within the discipline of history as the best that can be put forth at the current state of knowledge. These interpretations undergo constant testing and are altered or discarded as more evidence or new arguments permit the advancement of new, better interpretations. Here we find again the idea of truth as a long-run fated or destined convergence in scholarly opinion that Peirce proposed: "The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real."78 In the context of moral and political philosophy, Cheryl Misak has recently undertaken the critical elaboration of Peirce's positions, trying in the first place to rid them of their metaphysical dimension. Misak's principal conclusion is, in my view, perfectly adaptable for use also in the context of pragmatist philosophy of history: "Truth and objectivity are matters of what is best for the community of inquirers to believe, 'best' here amounting to that which best fits with the evidence and argument."79
